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ABSTRACT
The introduction of robust optimisation has pushed the state-of-the-
art in defending against adversarial attacks. However, the behaviour
of such optimisation has not been studied in the light of a funda-
mentally different class of attacks called backdoors. In this paper,
we demonstrate that adversarially robust models are susceptible
to backdoor attacks. Subsequently, we observe that backdoors are
reflected in the feature representation of such models. Then, this
observation is leveraged to detect backdoor-infected models via
a detection technique called AEGIS. Specifically, AEGIS uses fea-
ture clustering to effectively detect backdoor-infected robust Deep
Neural Networks (DNNs).
In our evaluation of major classification tasks using CIFAR-10,
MNIST and FMNIST datasets, AEGIS effectively detects robust
DNNs infected with backdoors. Overall, AEGIS has 97% (70/72)
detection accuracy and 0.3% (2/648) false positive rate, for all con-
figurations. Our investigation reveals that salient features of adver-
sarially robust DNNs break the stealthy nature of backdoor attacks.
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
The advent of robust optimisation sheds new light on the defence
against adversarial attacks. Specifically, if a machine learning (ML)
model was trained with robust optimisation, then such a model is
shown to be resilient against adversarial inputs [26] and we refer to
such a model as a robust model. These adversarial inputs are inten-
tionally crafted by attackers to cause an ML model to make wrong
predictions. Although adversarially robust ML models are believed
to be resilient against adversarial attacks, their susceptibility to
other attack vectors is unknown. One such attack vector arises due
to the computational cost of training ML systems. Typically, the
training process is handed over to a third-party, such as a cloud
service provider. Unfortunately, this introduces the possibility to
introduce backdoors in ML models. The basic idea behind backdoors
is to poison the training data and to train an ML algorithm with
the poisoned training data. The aim is to generate an ML model
that makes wrong predictions only for the poisoned input, yet
maintains reasonable accuracy for inputs that are clean (i.e. not
poisoned). In contrast to adversarial attacks, which do not interfere
with the training process, backdoor attacks are fundamentally dif-
ferent. Therefore, it is critical to investigate the impact of backdoor
attacks and related defences for adversarially robust ML models.
In this paper, we carefully investigate backdoor attacks for adver-
sarially robustmodels.We demonstrate that adversarially robustML
models can be infected with backdoors and such backdoor-infected
∗Equal Contribution
models result in high attack success rates. Then, we propose and
design AEGIS1 – a systematic methodology to automatically de-
tect backdoor-infected robust models. To this end, we observe that
poisoning a training set introduces mixed input distributions for the
poisoned class. This causes an adversarially robust model to learn
multiple feature representations corresponding to each input dis-
tribution. In contrast, from a clean training data, an adversarially
robust model learns only one feature representation for a particular
prediction class [33]. Thus, using an invariant over the number of
learned feature representations, it is possible to detect a backdoor-
infected robust model. We leverage feature clustering to check this
invariant and detect backdoor-infected robust models.
Due to the nature of training involved in producing robust mod-
els, they behave differently from standard ML models. This, in
turn, demands fundamentally different detection process to identify
backdoors. In contrast to existing works on backdoor attacks and
defence for ML models [2, 10, 38, 40, 42], in this paper, for the first
time, we investigate backdoors in the context of adversarially robust
ML models. Moreover, our proposed defence (AEGIS) is completely
automatic, unlike some defence against backdoors [38] our solution
does not require any access to the poisoned data.
After discussing the motivation (Section 2) and providing an
overview (Section 3), we make the following contributions:
(1) We discuss the process of injecting two major backdoors
(namely localised and distributed) during the training of an
adversarially robust model (Section 4).
(2) We propose the first backdoor detection technique for robust
models calledAEGIS. First, we show an invariant for checking
the backdoor-infected models. We then leverage such an
invariant via t-Distributed Stochastic Neighbour Embedding
(t-SNE) andMean shift clustering to detect backdoor-infected
models (Section 4).
(3) We evaluate the attack success rate of injecting localised as
well as distributed backdoor triggers to poison the training
data for MNIST, Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR-10. Our evalua-
tion reveals an average attack success rate of 96% (Section 5).
(4) We evaluate our defence on backdoor-infectedmodels trained
on three datasets. Our evaluation shows that AEGIS accu-
rately detects backdoor-infected models with 97% (70/72)
accuracy and it exposes the stealthy nature of backdoor at-
tacks to users (Section 5).
(5) We demonstrate that a straightforward adoption of backdoor
detection methodology for standard ML models [42] fails to
detect backdoors in robust models (Section 5).
After discussing related works (Section 6) and some threats to
validity (Section 7), we conclude in Section 8.
1AEGIS refers to the shield of the Greek god Zeus, it means divine shield. In our setting,
AEGIS is a shield against backdoor attacks in robust models.
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2 MOTIVATION
In this section, we show the limitations of known backdoor de-
fenses for standard models. We demonstrate why they fail to detect
backdoors in robust models and illustrate the need for a newmethod
to detect backdoors in robust models. First, we briefly describe the
state of the art defenses and their limitations. Next, we illustrate
the difference between backdoor behavior in robust models and
standard models. In particular, we show that in comparison to stan-
dard models, backdoor attacks in robust models exhibit different
behaviors, due to the non-brittle nature of robust models.
Limitations of the state of the art: There are several defenses
against backdoors for standard machine learning models. Table 1
highlights the main characteristics and weaknesses of these ap-
proaches. Notably, approaches that reverse engineer the backdoor
trigger (such as Neural Cleanse (NC) [42] and ABS [23]) can ef-
fectively detect backdoors for standard models. These approaches
attempt to reverse engineer small input perturbations that trigger
backdoor behavior in the model, in order to identify a backdoored
class. In this section, we compare to the reverse-engineering ap-
proach called Neural Cleanse (NC) [42]. NC is the state of the art
defense, and it has the most realistic defense assumptions, which
are similar to our assumptions forAEGIS. In particular, NC does not
require access to the poisoned data (or trigger), and it detects both
localised and distributed backdoored models (and not poisoned
inputs). NC is also computationally feasible (for robust) models, i.e.
it does not require training shadow or meta models like MNTD [47]
and NNoculation [41]. Moreover, unlike ABS [23], NC does not
assume or require that one compromised neuron is sufficient to
disclose the backdoor behavior.
However, NC relies on finding a fixed perturbation that mis-
classifies a large set of inputs. Although, this assumption holds for
standard models, it fails for robust models, since robust models are
designed to be resilient to exactly such perturbations, we show that
NC is inapplicable for robust models below (and in RQ3).
The need for a new method: The state of the art defenses for
backdoor detection in standard models fail to detect backdoors
in robust models, because they rely on assumptions that hold for
standard machine learning models, but do not hold for robust mod-
els. Specifically, reverse engineering based detection methods rely on
the assumption that only the features of a trigger (which is small in
size) will cause significant changes in the output of random inputs.
However, this assumption does not hold for robust models, due to
the non-brittle nature of robust models and the input perturbations
introduced during adversarial training [26]. In fact, we show that
this assumption causes false positives in robust models, such that
benign classes are misidentified as backdoored classes.
In a preliminary evaluation, we falsify the aforementioned as-
sumption for robust models, by constructing counter-examples. We
construct a trigger of a target benign class that causes the classi-
fication of most random inputs to the target class. This behavior
is unique to robust models, and unseen in standard models [26].
Specifically, in this experiment, we show that constructing a trigger
from a target benign class “Frog” for a robust CIFAR-10 classifier
causes random inputs (e.g. “dog") to be classified as “Frog”.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 1: (a) Generated trigger for a target benign class “Frog"; (b-c)
Sample input images of class “Dog" (b) and “Deer" (c) that are poi-
soned with the trigger (in (a)) show transitions to the target benign
class “Frog"
To demonstrate this claim, we use the inpainting2 feature seen in
existing work [33]. We take ten random images with a 12 x 12 mask.
We perform inpainting for the target class “Frog”. The inpainted
image represents a trigger for the target class “Frog”. We use these
triggers which are about 14% of the size of the image and measure
the attack success rate on another set of 100 random images. The
generated trigger is seen in Figure 1(a) and some of the generated
images are seen in Figure 1(b) and (c). For a reverse-engineered
trigger from a benign class, the backdoored robust model had up
to 84% attack success rate, meanwhile, the backdoored standard
model had 0% attack success rate. This result illustrates the funda-
mental difference between (backdoor behavior in) robust models
and standard models.
The reverse engineered trigger had 84% attack success rate for the
robust model, but 0% attack success rate on the standard model.
We show in this experiment that the inherent features of benign
classes can also cause significant changes in the output of random
inputs. Indeed, for robust models, this underlying assumption is not
only observed in backdoor triggers, but also in the inherent features
of benign classes. This result illustrates a major limitation of known
reverse engineering defenses, due to their reliance on the assump-
tion that this observation only occurs for the backdoored trigger.
Thus, reverse engineering approaches fail to accurately detect back-
doors in robust models. In this paper, we propose a new approach
(called AEGIS) to defend robust models against backdoor attacks.
Subsequently, we demonstrate that NC fails to detect backdoors for
robust models in RQ3.
The state-of-the-art backdoor detection methods for standard
models rely on an assumption that does not hold for robust models.
3 APPROACH OVERVIEW
Attack Model: We assume an attack model seen commonly in
previous work BadNets [10] and Trojan Attacks [24]. Specifically,
in such an attack model, the user has no control over the training
process. As a result, the user hands over the training data to an
untrusted third party along with the training process specifications.
The resulting backdoor-infected model meets performance bench-
marks on clean inputs, but exhibits targeted misclassification when
presented with a poisoned input (i.e. an input with an attacker
defined backdoor trigger).
2Typically, inpainting is used to restore missing features of an image, e.g. recover
missing or corrupted pixels. However, in this experiment, we apply inpainting to
generate a trigger from a benign class.
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Defense Defense(s) Detection Poison Whitebox Distributed Detects input Standard Online or UniqueType approach data access access backdoor or model or robust offline weakness
Outlier
suppression
Differential-privacy [5] data noising yes yes no input standard offline access to poisoned data
Gradient Shaping [15] data noising (DP-SGD) yes yes no input standard offline access to poisoned data
Input
Perturbation
NC [42] reverse engineer no yes yes model standard offline large triggers
ABS [23] reverse engineer no yes yes model standard offline one neuron assumption
MESA [30] reverse engineer no yes no model standard offline trigger size approx.
TABOR [12] reverse engineer no no no model standard offline large triggers
STRIP [9] input masking yes no yes input standard online source-label attacks
NEO [40],DeepCleanse [4] input masking yes no no input standard online distributed triggers
Model
anomaly
SentiNet [3] input masking, diff. testing yes no no input standard online distributed triggers
NeuronInspect [16] reverse engineer no yes no model standard offline distributed triggers
Spectral Signatures [38] feature representation yes yes no input standard offline access to poisoned data
Fine-pruning [21] neuron activation no yes yes model standard offline model accuracy drop
Activation-clustering [2] neuron activation yes yes no input standard offline access to poisoned data
SCAn [37] representation distribution yes no yes model standard offline access to poisoned data
NNoculation [41] input perturbation, GAN no no yes input standard offline requires shadow models
MNTD [47] meta neural analysis no yes yes model standard offline requires shadow models
AEGIS (this paper) feature clustering no yes yes model robust offline only for robust models
Table 1: Comparison of Backdoor Defense and mitigation methods
Figure 2: Image Translation using a robust model. This figure was
taken from Santurkar et al. [33]
We assume the attacker augments the training data with the
poisoned data (i.e. inputs with wrong labels) and then trains the
model. This attack model is much stronger than the attack models
considered in recent works [6, 38]. Specifically, in contrast to the
attack model considered in this paper, these works assume con-
trol over the training process (and additionally access to the clean
training data). Nonetheless, as our work revolves around the in-
vestigation of robust DNNs, we do require the model to be trained
under robust optimisation conditions. We note that it is possible to
check whether a model is robust [26].
In addition, we assume for the targeted class, that poisoned
inputs form an input distribution that is distinct from the distri-
bution of the clean (training) images, this is in line with previous
works [10, 24].
Image Translation: Image translation is an active area of research
in computer vision; several approaches have been developed for
image to image translation [17, 22, 49, 51]. Recently, it has been
established that generative adversarial networks (GANs) not only
learn the mapping from input image to output image, but also learn
a loss function to train this mapping [17]. Interestingly, this behav-
ior has also been seen in robust classifiers [18, 33, 39]. This finding
enables robust classifiers to translate images from one class to an-
other. In this paper, we apply image translation on robust classifiers
to generate the perceptually-aligned representation of the image
of a class. In particular, we use the adversarial robust training of
Santurkar et al. [33] because it provides a means to train models
that are more reliable and universal against a broader class of adver-
sarial inputs. For instance, the images seen in Figure 2 are generated
by a single CIFAR-10 classification model using first order methods,
such as projected gradient descent based adversarial attacks [26].
(a) (c) (e)
(b) (d) (f )
Figure 3: Translated images generated frommixed distributions by
backdoor-infected robust model for the class Horse (a-b), 7 (c-d) and
Sneaker (e-f). These are the target classes in the backdoor attack.
This result is achieved by simply maximising the probability of the
translated images to be classified under the targeted class.
Key Insight: If there exists amixture of distributions in the training
dataset, for a particular class, then the model will learn multiple
distributions. Concretely, the key insight leveraged in this paper is
as follows (for a particular class):
A robust model trained with a mixture of input distributions learns
multiple feature representations corresponding to the input
distributions in that particular mixture.
In this paper, we visualise the aforementioned insight in two
ways. First order methods (e.g. projected gradient descent based
adversarial attacks [26]) are used to generate a set of inputs Xy (i )
of a particular class with label y(i). Let us assume these inputs are
generated (by translation) via a model that has been trained using
a mixture distribution containing multiple input distributions in
a class with label y(i). Then, multiple types of inputs will be ob-
served in the generated inputs Xy (i ) . Such types of inputs should
correspond to the different distributions in the mixture distribution
for the class with label y(i). Consequently, if we visualise the fea-
ture representations of the generated inputs Xy (i ) , then we should
observe that the feature representations are distinct corresponding
to the distinct distributions in the mixture distribution for the class
with label y(i).
Formalising the insight: Let f be a robust classifier that we train.
For a fixed label y(i) in the set of labels, the training process will
attempt to minimise
Ex∼D
[
max
δ ∈∆
L(x + δ ,y(i))
]
(1)
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Here, for a fixed label y(i) and loss function L, the corresponding
training data x is drawn from the mixture of distributions D =∑n
k=0Dk . The set ∆ captures the imperceptible perturbations (small
ℓ2 ball around x ).
Let us assume we attempt to generate a set of samples X ′
y (i )
for the class with label y(i) using the classifier f . We first take an
appropriate seed distribution Gy . Subsequently, we generate an
input xy (i ) ∈ X ′y (i ) such that it minimises the following loss L for
label y(i):
xy (i ) = arдmin| |x ′−x0 | |2≤ϵ
L(x ′,y(i)), x0 ∼ Gy (2)
We posit that the setX ′
y (i ) will contain generated inputs that belong
to each distribution D0,D1, . . .Dn , which is part of the mixture
of distributions D.
Visualising the insight: To visualise this insight, we present Fig-
ure 3. The images shown in Figure 3 were generated via a model by
taking random images from the corresponding dataset: CIFAR-10
for Figure 3 (a-b), MNIST digit for Figure 3 (c-d) and Fashion-MNIST
for Figure 3 (f-g). This model was trained under robust optimisation
conditions with poisoned training data to infect the model with
backdoors. Random training data images are used to generate im-
ages of the target class in a robust backdoor-infected classifier. The
classes are Horse in CIFAR-10, the digit 7 in MNIST-digit and the
class Sneaker in Fashion-MNIST.
We observe the features that are maximised in Figure 3 (a, c, e)
correspond to the actual classes. Whereas the counterparts seen in
Figure 3 (b, d, f) correspond to the backdoor trigger (the small square
at the bottom right corner of the image) used during training. We
note that all images shown in Figure 3 were generated via the first
order methods, as described in [33], only on a backdoor-infected
robust model. This led us to observe both types of images (i.e.
perceptually aligned and poisoned).
In addition to the aforementioned insight, the feature represen-
tations of the poisoned images form clusters that are distinct from
the clusters of feature representations of clean images [2]. How-
ever, existing works exploit this [2] via accessing both the clean
and the poisoned data set. Having access to the poisoned data set
is impractical for defense, as the attacker is unlikely to make the
poisoned data available. In this work, we observe that the set of
translated images, for a backdoor-infected robust model, contain
both the clean (training) images and poisoned images. Thus, the
feature representations of these images form different clusters. We
use this observation to automate the detection of classes with a
backdoor, without any access to the poisoned images or the training
process.
Figure 4 captures the feature representations of a backdoor-
infected robust model. The feature representations are the outputs
of the last hidden layer of a DNN. We reduce the dimensions of the
feature representations and visualise them using t-SNE [25]. In this
case, we trained a robust network with a backdoor and the feature
representations in Figure 4 belong to the target class (Sneaker). The
images for this class (as generated via translation) have multiple
feature representations (i.e. using projected gradient descent based
adversarial attacks [26]). These multiple feature representations
Figure 4: Feature representations of translated images and training
images (for the class Sneaker) for a poisoned Fashion-MNIST classi-
fier
Figure 5: Feature representations of translated images and train-
ing images (for the class Sneaker) for an unpoisoned Fashion-MNIST
classifier
point to the fact that the robust model learnt from mixture distri-
butions in the (Sneaker) class. Thus, a quick check of the translated
images reveals two types of images – one corresponding to the
actual class Sneaker and one to the backdoor as seen in Figure 3
(e-f).
In contrast, Figure 5 captures the feature representations of a
clean, yet robust model. The feature representations of the trans-
lated images for class Sneaker form only one cluster. This is expected
behaviour, because the clean model learns only one distribution in
Sneaker class. Consequently, the translated images also form only
one representation that maximises the probability to be categorised
in Sneaker class.
We observe, there are two clusters for every untargeted or clean
class, specifically, the training set cluster and the translated image
cluster. The translated images form a different cluster from the train-
ing set because they maximise the class probability of the training
images. As a result they exaggerate the feature representations of
the training set most effectively [33]. This phenomenon leads to
the translated images forming a separate cluster. It is important to
note that this behavior is in line with the behaviour seen in the
robustmodels in existing work [7]. We also observe this in Figure 14
(Appendix B).
Feature Clustering:We automate the detection of clusters of
feature representations by leveraging the mean shift clustering
algorithm [8]. An example of applying mean shift can be seen in
Figure 6, where the mean shift algorithm predicts three classes for
the translated images, as generated by a backdoor-infected robust
model. We further investigated the content inside these clusters by
checking the images associated with the feature representations
that make up these clusters. Specifically, the purple cluster (cf. Fig-
ure 6) contained inputs seen in Figure 7(a). These are the translated
inputs which exhibit the backdoor. In contrast, the inputs seen in
the yellow cluster (cf. Figure 6) contained translated images seen in
Figure 7(b). These images correspond to the features of the actual
training images in class Sneaker.
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Figure 6: Mean shift clustering of the feature representations of
translated images and training images (for the class Sneaker) for a
poisoned Fashion-MNIST classifier
(a)
(b)
Figure 7: Inputs in the clusters seen in Figure 6. The purple cluster
contains inputs seen in (a), where as the yellow cluster represents
contains inputs seen in (b). It is important to note that these images
were generated in the same instantiation of the projected gradient
descent based adversarial attacks [26].
4 DETAILED METHODOLOGY
Backdoor Injection:We show that despite being highly resilient
to known adversarial attacks [26], robust backdoor models are still
susceptible to backdoor attacks. It takes very few poisoned training
images (as little as 1%) for the backdoor to be successfully injected.
We use backdoor injection techniques similar to the one seen in
Gu et al. [10]. We randomly select and poison one percent of the
training images at random from each dataset (e.g. 500 images for
CIFAR-10). We poison these images by adding the respective back-
door trigger (localised or distributed) to the images and augment
them to the training data. Once this modified dataset is ready, we
train the model using this data.
Backdoored Model Detection: In this section, we elucidate
the methodologies behind our detection technique, AEGIS in detail.
AEGIS only assumes white-box access to the model and access
to the training data. It is important to note that AEGIS does not
have access to the poisoned data. In Section 4, we introduce some
notation to help us illustrate our approach.
Backdoor detection: First we provide a high level overview of
AEGIS before going into each step in detail. Typically, the data
points of a particular class follow a single distribution and as a
result, form only one cluster after undergoing t-SNE [25]. However,
when a backdoor attack is carried out, the adversary inadvertently
injects a mixture of distributions in one class, resulting in more
than one cluster. The identification of a mixture distribution in a
class is the main intuition behind our approach.
The hypothesis is that the image generation process for robust
models, as seen in Santurkar et al. [33], will follow similar distri-
butions as the training data. Since the target class in a backdoor
model will be learning from multiple distributions, there will be
multiple distributions of feature representation of the translated
images (generated via first order adversarial methods). Our aim is to
f The robust machine learning classifier under test.
Y Set of labels for f
D The full training data
L The loss function
R A function that returns the feature representation flattened to single 1D vector
X
y(i ) Vector of training data points for label y
(i ) ∈ Y
X ′
y(i ) Vector of translated data points for label y
(i ) ∈ Y
Table 2: Notations used in our approach
Algorithm 1 Backdoor Detection using AEGIS
Input: Robust ML classifier f , Sample of training data points X , Sample
of translated data points X ′, bandwidth for the mean shift algorithm b
for y(i ) ∈ Y do
RX
y(i ) = R(f , Xy (i ) )
RX ′
y(i )
= R(f , X ′
y (i ) )
Ry (i ) = concatenate(RXy(i ) , RX ′y(i ) )
▷ tsne reduces the feature dimensions
Rˆy (i ) = tsne(Ry (i ), b)
predicted_classes =meanshif t (Rˆy (i ) )
analyseForBackdoor (Rˆy (i ), predicted_classes)
end for
detect these multiple feature distributions. To detect such multiple
distributions, we leverage t-SNE and Mean shift clustering.
For each label y(i) ∈ Y , Algorithm 1 generates translated im-
ages via first order-based adversarial methods (see Figure 8 Step
1). Then, it extracts the feature representations from the training
and translated images for the label y(i) (see Figure 8 Step 2). Next,
the dimensions of the extracted features are reduced using t-SNE
(see Figure 8 Step 3). Mean shift is then employed to calculate the
number of clusters in the reduced feature representations (see Fig-
ure 8 Step 4). Finally, the number of resulting clusters is used to flag
the backdoor-infected model (and poisoned class) as suspicious, if
necessary.
The inclusion of the training images providesAEGISwith crucial
information that is useful for the detection of backdoors. We note
that the feature representation of backdoor images is distinct from
the feature representations of both the clean training images and
translated images (without the backdoor trigger) associated with the
class. Consequently, adding the training images in the detection
process helps us avoid false positives. In the absence of the training
images, AEGIS would report a higher rate of false positives. An
example of such false positives is seen in Figure 15 (Appendix B).
Step 1 - Image Translation: To effectively analyse a model
for backdoors, a vector of translated images X ′
y (i ) where y
(i) ∈ Y
needs to be built. In robust classifiers, image translation leads to
perceptually aligned images [33]. This image translation is done for
ally(i) ∈Y . The following function is minimised (and the probability
of the target class y(i) is maximised):
x = arдmin
| |x ′−x0 | |2≤ϵ
L(x ′,y(i)), x0 ∈ D (3)
AEGIS samples a seed from the training data D and minimises
the loss L of the particular label y(i) to generate the translated
Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA Trovato and Tobin, et al.
Training
Input (X)
Robust
Model (f)
Translation using
Robust Model 1©
Feature Representation
Extraction 2© TSNE 3©
Meanshift
Clustering 4©
Clean
Model
Backdoored
Model
Random training
set images
Translated
images
Feature
Representations
Feature Representation
after TSNE
clusters > 2
clusters ≤ 2
Figure 8: Overview of the detection technique
images (see Figure 8 Step 1). This is done across 500 random seed
images to obtain X ′
y (i ) .
Step 2 - Feature Representations: Since AEGIS relies on the
feature representations of the images, the algorithm now extracts
them using Xy (i ) and X ′y (i ) for y
(i) ∈ Y . We define R as a function
that maps an input x to a vector R(x , f ) in the representation
(penultimate layer) for a robust model f .
Once Xy (i ) and X ′y (i ) are generated for y
(i) ∈ Y , AEGIS runs a
forward pass of all the inputs x ∈ Xy (i ) and x ′ ∈ X ′y (i ) through the
robust model f . AEGIS extracts the outputs of the last hidden layer
and flattens them to form feature representations RXy(i ) and RX ′y(i )
,
for Xy (i ) and X ′y (i ) , respectively (see Figure 8 Step 2). These feature
representations concatenated into Ry (i ) for each y(i) ∈ Y .
Step 3 - t-SNE: t-distributed stochastic neighbour embedding (t-
SNE) is a data visualisation technique first introduced inMaaten and
Hinton [25]. It is a nonlinear dimensionality reduction algorithm,
which is primarily used to visualise high dimensional data in a two
or three dimensional space. t-SNE is used to visualise the feature
representations Ry (i ) for all y(i) ∈ Y and to reduce their dimension
(see Figure 8 Step 3). This is done to find any unusual clustering in
the translated images. As expected, there are multiple clusters (> 2)
of feature representations in the target class of a backdoored model.
As seen in Figure 4 for a target class, the feature representations
of the translated images show two clusters. This is because the
learning process had inputs from two distributions (i.e. clean inputs
and poisoned inputs).
Step 4 - Detection using Mean shift: To further automate the
process of detection, the mean shift algorithm [8] is leveraged by
AEGIS. This is a clustering algorithm which is used to identify
the clusters automatically. Mean shift tries to locate the modes
of a density function. It does this by trying to discover "blobs"
in a smooth density of samples (see Figure 8 Step 4). It updates
candidates for centroids to be a mean of points in a given region
and then eliminates duplicates to form a final set of points [8].
One can see in Figure 6 that the algorithm identifies four classes.
After the mean shift, all the classes that show multiple distributions
(clusters > 2) in the translated images are flagged as suspicious. A
user can examine the examples in the cluster as seen in Figure 7,
which helps the user to determine if the model was poisoned.
5 EVALUATION
In this section, we describe the experimental setup and the results
for the backdoor injection attack and the proposed detection tech-
nique, using three major classification tasks.
Image Dataset Arch. Input # of ImagesType (#labels) Size training test
Objects CIFAR-10 (10) ResNet50 32 x 32 x 3 50,000 10,000
Digits MNIST (10) ResNet18 28 x 28 x 1 60,000 10,000
Fashion
Article
Fashion-
MNIST (10) ResNet18 28 x 28 x 1 60,000 10,000
Table 3: Dataset details and complexity of classification tasks
Research questions: We evaluate the success rate of backdoor
injection attacks on adversarially robust models and the effective-
ness of our detection technique (AEGIS). In particular, we ask the
following research questions:
• RQ1 Attack Success Rate. How effective is backdoor in-
jection attacks on adversarially robust models?
• RQ2 Detection Effectiveness. How effective is the pro-
posed detection approach, i.e. AEGIS?
• RQ3 Comparison to the state of the art. How effective
is AEGIS in comparison to the state of the art, i.e. Neural-
Cleanse (NC)?
• RQ4 Sensitivity Analysis of Detection Parameters. Is
AEGIS sensitive to detection parameters epsilon (ϵ) andmean
shift bandwidth?
• RQ5 Attack Comparison.What is the comparative perfor-
mance of localised and distributed backdoors, in terms of
attack success rate and detection by AEGIS?
• RQ6 Detection Efficiency.What is the time performance
of AEGIS?
5.1 Experimental Setup
Evaluation setup: Experiments were conducted on nine similar
Virtual Machine (VM) instances on the Google Cloud platform,
each VM is a PyTorch Deep Learning instance on an n1-highmem-4
machine (with 4 vCPU and 26 GB memory). Each VM had an Intel
Broadwell CPU platform, 1 X NVIDIA Tesla GPU with eight to
16GB GPU memory and a 100 GB standard persistent disk.
Datasets and Models: For our experiments, we use the CIFAR-
10 [19], MNIST [20] and Fashion-MNIST [46] datasets. MNIST and
Fashion-MNIST have 60,000 training images each, while CIFAR-10
has 50,000 training images (cf. Table 3). Each dataset has 10 classes
and 10,000 test images. MNIST and Fashion-MNIST experiments
were trainedwith the standard ResNet-18 architecture, while CIFAR-
10 was trained using the standard ResNet-50 architecture [13]. All
experiments were conducted with the default learning rate (LR)
scheduling in the robustness package [7], i.e. the PyTorch StepLR
optimisation scheduler. The learning rate is initially set to 0.1 for
training (LR) and the scheduler decays the learning rate of each
parameter group by 0.1 (gamma) every 50 epochs (default step size).
All models were trained with momentum of 0.9 and weight decay of
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(b) (d) (f)
Figure 9: Triggers for MNIST (a) localised and (b) distributed back-
doors, Fashion-MNIST (c) localised and (d) distributed backdoors
and CIFAR-10 (e) localised and (f) distributed backdoors
5e−4. Only CIFAR-10 models were trained with data augmentation3,
with momentum of 0.9 and weight decay of 5e−4.
Adversarial Training: Some approaches have been proposed to
guarantee adversarial training of machine learning models [26, 31,
34, 44, 45]. Notably, Wong et al. [45] and Wong and Kolter [44] aim
to train models that are provably robust against norm-bounded
adversarial perturbations on the training data. Sinha et al. [34] and
Raghunathan et al. [31] are focused on training and guaranteeing
the performance of ML models under adversarial input perturba-
tions. However, the aforementioned approaches either consider
very small adversarial perturbation budget epsilon (epsilon), do not
scale to larger neural nets or datasets (beyond MNIST) or have a
huge computational overhead.
In this paper, we apply the robust optimization approach pro-
posed by Madry et al. [26] for adversarial training. In particular,
it is computationally inexpensive, it provides security guarantees
against a wider range of adversarial perturbations and it scales to
large networks and datasets (such as CIFAR-10). For our evalua-
tion, all models were trained with robust optimisation based on
the adversarial training approach [26] with an l2 perturbation set.
The parameters for robust training are the same for all datasets (see
Table 8 in Appendix A). In particular, all models were trained with
an adversarial attack budget of 0.5 (ϵ), and an attack step size of
1.5 (step size) and set to take 20 steps (# steps) during adversarial
attack. All other hyperparameters are set to the default hyperpa-
rameters in the robustness package [7]. No hyperparameter tuning
was performed for the adversarial training of models.
Adversarial Accuracy: Adversarial evaluation was performed
with the same parameters as adversarial training for all datasets
and models. In particular, all classifiers were evaluated with an
adversarial attack budget of 0.5 (ϵ), and an attack step size of 1.5
and set to take 20 steps during adversarial attack. In addition, for
adversarial evaluation, we use the best loss in PGD step as the at-
tack (“use_best": True), with no random restarts (“random_restarts":
0) and no fade in epsilon along epochs (“eps_fadein_epochs": 0).
Overall, results showed that all models maintained a similarly high
adversarial accuracy for both clean and backdoor-infected models
(see Table 10 in Appendix A). Specifically, we obtained 86.22% adver-
sarial accuracy, on average. Hence, adversarial training accuracy is
not inhibited by the backdoor attack vector.
Attack Configuration:We employed the backdoor data poison-
ing approach outlined in BadNets [10] to inject backdoors during
3This is the default configuration in the robustness package for CIFAR-10
Dataset
Backdoor-Infected Models
Clean
Model
Attack Success Rate
(Classification accuracy)
Localised Distributed
CIFAR-10 82.58 (89.80) 99.85 (90.22) 90.28
MNIST 99.96 (99.59) 100.00 (99.53) 99.61
Fashion-MNIST 96.26 (91.83) 99.77 (91.80) 91.99
Table 4: Backdoor attack success rate and classification accuracy
adversarial training for all datasets. For infected models and all
datasets, we created a set of backdoor infected images by mod-
ifying a portion of the training datasets, specifically we apply a
trigger to one percent of the clean images in the training set (e.g.
600 images for the MNIST dataset). Additionally, we modify the
class label of each poisoned image to class seven for all datasets
and all attack types, then we train DNN models with the modified
training data to 100 epochs for Fashion-MNIST and MNIST, and
110 epochs for CIFAR-10.
The triggers for each attack and tasks are shown in Figure 9.
The trigger for localised backdoors is a square at the bottom right
corner of the image, this is to avoid covering the important parts of
the original training image. The trigger for distributed backdoors
is made up of two smaller squares, one at the top left corner of the
image and another at the bottom right corner. The total size of the
trigger is less than one percent of the entire image for both attacks.
Detection Configuration: The detection configuration used in
our evaluation are shown in Table 9 (Appendix A). For each dataset,
the epsilon (ϵ) ball for input perturbation is fixed. For MNIST and
Fashion-MNIST, the parameter ϵ is 100 and it is 500 for CIFAR-10.
This places a uniform limit on input perturbation for each dataset.
The perplexity for t-SNE is a tuneable parameter that balances the
attention between the local and global aspects of the data. The
authors suggest a value between five and 50 [25] and as a result
we chose 30. The bandwidth in the mean shift algorithm is the size
of the kernel function. This value is constant for each dataset, it is
automatically computed with the scikit-learn mean shift clustering
algorithm.4 The resulting bandwidths are 35, 28 and 21 for MNIST,
Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR-10, respectively.
EvaluationMetrics:Wemeasure the performance of the backdoor
injection attack by computing the classification accuracy on the
testing data. We compute the attack success rate by applying the
trigger to all test images and measuring the number of modified
images that are classified to the attack target label, i.e. classified
to class seven. We also measure the classification accuracy of the
clean adversarially robust models as a baseline for comparison. In
addition, for detection efficacy, we report the number of feature
representation clusters found for all classes of all robust models.
5.2 Experimental Results
RQ1 - Attack Success Rate: In this section, we present the ef-
fectiveness of the backdoor injection attack. We illustrate that
backdoors can be effectively injected in robust models without
significantly reducing the classification accuracy of the models.
4https://scikit-learn.org/stable/modules/generated/sklearn.cluster.estimate_
bandwidth.html
Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA Trovato and Tobin, et al.
Class
Type
Class
Labels
MNIST Models Fashion-MNIST Models CIFAR-10 Models
Backdoor-Infected Clean Backdoor-Infected Clean Backdoor-Infected CleanLocal Distributed Local Distributed Local Distributed
Targeted {7} 3 3 2 4 3 2 3 4 2
Untargeted {0 − 6, 8, 9} 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Table 5: Detection Efficacy: Number of feature clusters for each class
(a) Standard model (b) Robust model
Figure 10: Anomaly indices for the reverse engineered triggers for
backdoor-infected standard and robust models
In our evaluation, we found that robust models are highly vulner-
able to backdoor attacks. Backdoors effectively caused the misclas-
sification of 96.4% of backdoor-infected images to the attacker se-
lected target labels, across all datasets and attack types. Specifically,
on average, localised backdoors and distributed backdoors caused
the misclassification of 92.93% and 99.87% of backdoor-infected
images, respectively (cf. Table 4).
Robust DNNs are highly susceptible to backdoor attacks, with a
96.4% attack success rate, on average.
Backdoor injection in robust DNNs does not cause a significant
reduction in the classification accuracy for clean images. Backdoor-
infectedmodels still achieved a high classification accuracy for clean
images, 93.8% classification accuracy on average. In comparison,
clean robust models achieved a 93.96% classification accuracy, this
shows an insignificant reduction in accuracy of 0.18%. In particular,
localised and distributed backdoors maintained a high classification
accuracy of 93.74% and 93.85% on average, respectively (cf. Table 4).
Backdoor-infected robust models maintain a high classification
accuracy on clean images (93.8% on average).
RQ2 - Detection Effectiveness: In this section, we evaluate the ef-
ficacy of our backdoor detection approach (AEGIS).We demonstrate
that the technique is effective in (a) detecting backdoor-infected
robust models and (b) revealing the backdoor-infected class.
In our evaluation,AEGIS effectively detected all backdoor-infected
robust DNNs, for both localised and distributed backdoors, for all
classification tasks. It accurately detected all backdoor-infected
models by identifying classes that have more than two feature
clusters for the training set and the translated image set. The re-
sults showed that all clean untargeted classes of backdoor-infected
robust models, as well as all classes of clean robust models have
exactly two clusters, while, all targeted classes of backdoor-infected
models have more than two clusters (cf. Table 5).
In particular, for each targeted class, the mean shift clustering of
the features of the backdoor-infected models reveals these models
consistently have more than two clusters. Notably, these clusters
include one cluster for the clean training images and at least two
Detection
Parameters #Configs
#Detection
Accuracy (#)
#Failure
Rate (#)
#False Positive
Rate (#)
Epsilon (ϵ ) 54 98.1% (53) 1.9% (1) 0% (0)
Mean shift bandwidth 18 94.4% (17) 5.6% (1) 1.2% (2)
Table 6: Sensitivity to Detection Parameters
clusters for the translated images. The clusters for the translated
images include at least one cluster capturing the image translation
for the poisoned images, and another cluster for the translated clean
images. Meanwhile, the clean untargeted classes have precisely two
clusters of features, one for the training set and another for the
translated image set. Likewise, for the clean robust models, each
class has exactly two distinct clusters, one cluster for the training
set and another cluster for the translated image set (cf. Table 5).
AEGIS effectively detected all (100%) backdoored robust DNNs.
AEGIS accurately identified the infected class, for all classifi-
cation tasks and both attacks (cf. Table 5). The mean shift feature
clustering of each class in the backdoor-infected model reveals that
only the infected class had more than two clusters, with one clus-
ter for the training set and at least two clusters for the translated
images.
AEGIS identified the backdoored class for all classification tasks.
RQ3 Comparison to the state of the art. In this section we com-
pare our backdoor detection approach (AEGIS) to the state of the
art backdoor detection technique called NeuralCleanse (NC) [42].
NC is a reverse engineering approach that assumes the reverse en-
gineered trigger for the backdoor-infected class is smaller than the
median size of the reverse engineered trigger for all classes. Specif-
ically, NC’s outlier detector identifies a class as backdoor-infected
(with 95% probability) if it has an anomaly index that is larger than
two. Although, this assumption holds for standard models because
the underlying distribution of data points is normal [42], it does
not hold for robust models. Due to the unbrittle nature of robust
models [26], the underlying distribution of data points does not
form a normal distribution because of adversarial perturbations
introduced during robust training.
To compare NC and AEGIS, we run NC to detect localised back-
doors in a standard model and a robust model. First, we train stan-
dard and robust models for CIFAR-10 that are poisoned with lo-
calised backdoors (using the backdoor injection process described
in Section 4). We then reverse engineer the trigger for both the stan-
dard and robust backdoor-infected models using projected gradient
descent on 100 random images from the training set [26].5 Finally,
we estimate the anomaly index for each class, i.e. the size of the
trigger for each class by measuring the average L1 norm deviation
from the original images to the reverse-engineered images (this is
equivalent to counting the number of pixels changed). The mean
L1 norms are seen in Figure 16 (Appendix B).
5We ensured that the NC detection parameters (the epsilon and step size) are the same
for both the standard and robust models.
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Our evaluation results shows thatNC detects the poisoned class for
standard models, but it fails to accurately detect the poisoned class for
robust models. In contrast, AEGIS detected the backdoor-infected
robust model as well as the poisoned class (see RQ2). Figure 10
shows the anomaly indices for each class, i.e. the estimated size of
the reverse engineered trigger, for a standard backdoor-infected
model (a) and for a robust backdoor-infected model (b). The red bar
represents the anomaly index for the backdoor-infected class. We
found that on standard models, the size of the backdoor-infected
class is small and it is indeed detected as anomalous by NC, i.e. the
anomaly index of the poisoned class (class seven) is greater than
two (cf. Figure 10(a)). However, on robust models, NC fails to detect
the poisoned class as anomalous. In fact, the anomaly index of the
backdoor-infected class in the robust model is significantly less
than two (cf. Figure 10(b)). This result suggests that while NC is
suitable for backdoor detection in standard models, it is not suitable
for detecting backdoor in robust models.
The state of the art backdoor defense (NeuralCleanse) fails to
accurately detect the backdoor-infected class for robust model.
RQ4 - Sensitivity Analysis w.r.t. Detection parameters: We
evaluate the sensitivity of AEGIS to varying values of the detection
parameters, i.e. epsilon (ϵ) and mean shift bandwidth.6 We evaluate
the sensitivity of these parameters for all attacks and data sets. For
both parameters, we report the detection accuracy and the false
positive rate for all tested values of both parameters. Although
the mean shift bandwidth was automatically computed using the
scikit-learn mean shift clustering algorithm, we still examined the
sensitivity of the resulting values with a variance of ±3. For MNIST
and FMNIST dataset, we experimented with varying epsilon values
of ±40 around the default value of 100 used, i.e. between 60 and
140, in particular, ϵ ∈ {60, 70, 80, 90, 100, 110, 120, 130, 140}. For
CIFAR-10, we experiment with varying epsilon values of ±200
around the default value of 500 used, i.e. between 300 and 700
(ϵ ∈ {300, 350, 400, 450, 500, 550, 600, 650, 700}).
The epsilon sensitivity results showed that AEGIS has a very
low sensitivity to varying values of epsilon. For all values of epsilon,
AEGIS could identify a backdoor-infected model and the poisoned
class for 98% (53 out of 54 configurations) of all configurations, with
no false positives (see Table 6). One backdoor-infected model was
undetected, specifically, the distributed backdoor attack on MNIST
at ϵ = 60. We found that for the MNIST distributed backdoor attack,
the epsilon value at 60 is too low. Indeed, it causesAEGIS to wrongly
cluster the translated poisoned images with the (translated) training
images. Thus, we recommend that higher epsilon (ϵ) values be used
for (distributed) backdoor detection.
For all values of epsilon (ϵ), AEGIS detected 98% of the
backdoor-infected models, with no false positives.
For mean shift sensitivity, our evaluation revealed thatAEGIS has
a very low sensitivity to varying values of the mean shift bandwidth.
AEGIS detected 94% of the backdoored model for all mean shift con-
figurations, i.e. 17 out of 18 configurations (see Table 6). In particular,
for all tested mean shift values, AEGIS did not detect a backdoored
6We do not evaluate the sensitivity of the t-SNE perplexity parameter, because this
has been shown to be robust between values five and 50 [25].
Dataset
Detection Time
Localised Distributed
mins (secs) mins (secs)
MNIST 5.08 (304.5) 5.18 (310.5)
Fashion-MNIST 5.36 (321.5) 5.32 (319.4)
CIFAR-10 9.39 (563.5) 9.34 (560.6)
Table 7: Detection Efficiency
model for one value of the mean shift bandwidth. Specifically, such
a mean shift value is 24 for the CIFAR-10 model poisoned with
distributed backdoor. This result suggests that for values higher
than the computed mean shift bandwidth value, AEGIS may not
detect the backdoor-infected class. Besides, AEGIS reported two
false positives. In both cases a benign class other than the poisoned
class was also misclassified as backdoored by AEGIS. Specifically,
false positives were manifested for MNIST localised backdoored
and CIFAR-10 distributed backdoored models, both with mean shift
bandwidth values less than the computed values. Hence, we recom-
mend to use the computed mean shift bandwidth value for accurate
backdoor detection.
AEGIS has a 94% detection accuracy and a 1.2% false positive rate,
for all mean shift bandwidth values.
RQ5 - Attack Comparison: In this section, we compare the per-
formance of the two attack types, namely the localised and the
distributed backdoor attack. Specifically, we compare the attack
success rate, the classification accuracy and the detection efficacy
for both attacks.
The distributed backdoor attack is more effective than the lo-
calised backdoor attack, it has a higher attack success rate. The
distributed attack is 6.95% more successful than the localised attack,
on average (cf. Table 4). Additionally, the distributed backdoors
have a higher classification accuracy than the localised backdoors,
albeit only a slight improvement of 0.12%. Overall, the distributed
backdoors performed better than the localised backdoors.
The distributed backdoor attack is (6.95%) more effective than the
localised backdoor attack, on average.
In our evaluation, AEGIS effectively detects both attacks equally.
AEGIS is designed to be attack agnostic: It is effective regardless of
the attack type (i.e. localised or distributed backdoors). In addition,
for both attacks, AEGIS detected the infected class (cf. Table 5).
AEGIS is attack-agnostic: it effectively detects both localised and
distributed backdoor-infected models.
RQ6 Detection Efficiency. We evaluate the detection time of
AEGIS, i.e. the time taken to detect a backdoor-infected model.
Table 7 shows the time taken for each attack type and dataset.
AEGIS is very efficient in backdoor-detection; it took five to nine
minutes to detect a backdoor-infected model. In contrast, the state of
the art defenses (for standard models) are known to take hours to
days to detect a backdoor-infected model [9, 42]. Furthermore, we
observed that the time taken by AEGIS increases as the complexity
of the model and dataset increases (see Table 7). For instance, AEGIS
took almost twice the time taken to detect backdoors in MNIST
(five minutes) to detect backdoors in CIFAR-10 (nine minutes). In
addition, there is no significant difference in the time taken to detect
each attack type, i.e. localised or distributed backdoor (see Table 7).
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These results illustrate that AEGIS is computationally efficient and
the efficiency is not adversely affected by the backdoor attack type.
AEGIS was reasonably fast in detecting backdoored models, it took
five to nine minutes to detect a backdoor-infected model.
6 RELATEDWORK
Adversarial Robustness:Adversarial attacks for Neural Networks
(NNs) were first introduced in [36]. Researchers have introduced
better adversarial attacks and built systems that are resilient to these
attacks [14, 27–29]. A significant leap has been made by introducing
robust optimisation to mitigate adversarial attacks [26, 32, 35, 43].
These defences aim to guarantee the performance of machine learn-
ing models against adversarial examples. In this paper, we study
the susceptibility of the models trained using robust optimisation
to backdoor attacks. Then, we leverage the inherent properties of
robust models to detect backdoor attacks.
Backdoor attacks: Backdoor attacks were introduced in BadNets
[10], where an attacker poisons the training data by augmenting it.
A pre-defined random shape is chosen for the attack. TrojanNN [24]
improves the attack by engineering the trigger and reducing the
number of examples needed to insert the backdoor. Yao et al. [48]
propose a transfer learning based backdoor. All of these attackswere
demonstrated for standard DNNs. To the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to demonstrate the susceptibility of models trained
under robust optimisation conditions [26] to backdoor attacks.
Backdoor Detection and Mitigation: Several approaches have
been developed to detect and mitigate backdoor attacks on standard
machine learning models. Table 1 compares the main characteristics
of these approaches. These approaches can be categorized into three
main types, namely, backdoor detection via (1) outlier suppression,
(2) input perturbation and (3) model anomalies [1].
Outlier suppression based defenses prevent backdoored inputs
from being introduced into the model [5, 15]. The main idea of
these approaches is to employ differential privacy mechanism to
ensure that backdoored inputs are under-represented in the training
set. Unlike these approaches, our approach is not a training-time
defense, rather the focus of our approach is to detect models that
are already poisoned with backdoored inputs.
Input perturbation methods detect backdoors by attempting to
reverse engineer small input perturbations that trigger backdoor
behavior in the model. Such approaches include Neural Cleanse
(NC) [42], ABS [23], TABOR [12], STRIP [9], NEO [40], Deep-
Cleanse [4] and MESA [30]. In this paper, we focus on comparison
to Neural Cleanse (NC) [42], we used NC as the representative back-
door defense. We compare our approach to NC (see RQ3), since
NC is the state of the art and it has realistic defense assumptions
(similar to AEGIS) (see Table 1). In particular, NC relies on finding
a fixed perturbation that mis-classifies a large set of inputs, but
since robust models are designed to be resilient to exactly such
perturbations, we show that NC is inapplicable for robust models.
Model anomaly defenses detect backdoors by identifying anom-
alies in themodel behavior. Most of these techniques focus on identi-
fying how the model behaves differently on benign and backdoored
inputs, using model information such as logit layers, intermedi-
ate neuron values and spectral representations. These approaches
include SentiNet [3], spectral signatures [38], fine-pruning [21],
NeuronInspect [16], activation clustering [2], SCAn [37], NNocu-
lation [41] and MNTD [47]. However, unlike our approach, none
of these techniques detect backdoors in robust models. Addition-
ally, SCAn [37], SentiNet [3], activation clustering [2] and spectral
signatures [38] assume access to the poisoned dataset – an im-
practical assumption for backdoor defense (see Table 1). Moreover,
fine-pruning [21] is shown to be ineffective in existing work [42]
and NNoculation [41] and MNTD [47] require training a shadow
model for defense, leading to a computationally inefficient pro-
cess. In contrast, AEGIS is computationally efficient, it does not
require access to the poisoned dataset and it accurately detects
robust models with backdoors.
Unlike the aforementioned works, we rely on the clustering of
feature representations in robust models to detect backdoor attacks.
Like our approach, Chen et al. [2] employs feature clustering to
detect backdoors in standard DNNs ; it uses the feature representa-
tions of the training and poisoned data to detect the poisoned data.
However, their approach relies on the strong assumption that the
user has access to the poisoned dataset. Our approach requires access
to only the model and the clean training dataset.
7 THREATS TO VALIDITY
Our evaluation is limited by the following threats to validity:
External validity: This refers to the generalisability of our ap-
proach and results. There is a threat that our approach does not
generalise to other classification tasks.We havemitigated this threat
by evaluating the performance of our approach using three major
classification tasks with varying levels of complexity. These tasks
have thousands of training and test images, providing confidence
that our approach will work on complex tasks and models.
Construct validity: It is possible that advanced backdoor triggers
can be crafted to align to the input distribution of the training
dataset. We mitigate this threat by ensuring that our backdoor trig-
gers are similar to the ones described in the literature, as reported
in previous related research. We emphasize that for robust models,
the success and mitigation of backdoor attack variants such as blind
backdoors [1], hidden triggers [50], trojaning [11, 24, 52] and adap-
tive attacks [9] are open research problems. These attacks have not
been investigated for robust models. We consider the investigation
of these advanced attacks against robust models as future work.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we demonstrate a new attack vector for robust ML
models, namely backdoor attacks. We show that robust models are
susceptible to backdoors. Then, we leverage the inherent proper-
ties of robust ML models to detect this attack. AEGIS accurately
detects backdoor-infected models and the poisoned class, without
any access to the poisoned data. Our work reveals a major strength
of robust optimisation in exposing backdoors. Our code and experi-
mental data are available for replication:
https://github.com/sakshiudeshi/Expose-Robust-Backdoors
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A ADDITIONAL TABLES
Dataset Epochs LR Batch Size LR Schedule
CIFAR-10 110 0.1 128 Drop by 10 at epochs ∈ [50, 100]
MNIST 100 0.1 128 Drop by 10 at epochs ∈ [50, 100]
Fashion-MNIST 100 0.1 128 Drop by 10 at epochs ∈ [50, 100]
Table 8: Standard hyperparameters used for model training.
Detection
Parameters
All Models
MNIST Fashion-MNIST CIFAR-10
Epsilon (ϵ) 100 100 500
t-SNE Perplexity 30 30 30
Mean shift Bandwidth 35 28 21
Table 9: Backdoor Detection Parameters
Dataset
Adversarial Accuracy
Backdoor-Infected Models Clean
ModelLocalised Distributed
CIFAR-10 68.26 68.17 68.64
MNIST 99.51 99.49 99.55
Fashion-MNIST 90.78 90.66 90.91
Table 10: Adversarial accuracy of all robust classifiers
B ADDITIONAL FIGURES
Representative benign class Predicted clusters for benign class
Target class Predicted clusters for backdoored class)
Figure 11: Feature representation clusters for backdoored CIFAR models (Localised) with target class Horse (7). This figure
shows class 0 and 7. The left column shows the feature representations of the translated and the training images, whereas
the right column shows the result of the Mean shift clustering on the corresponding points where different colours represent
different classes.
Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA Trovato and Tobin, et al.
Representative benign class Predicted clusters for benign class
Target class Predicted clusters for backdoored class)
Figure 12: Feature representation clusters for backdoored CIFAR models (Distributed) with target class Horse (7). This figure
shows class 0 and 7. The left column shows the feature representations of the translated and the training images, whereas
the right column shows the result of the Mean shift clustering on the corresponding points where different colours represent
different classes.
Figure 13: Feature representation clusters for clean CIFAR10 models. This figure shows class 0 and 7. The left column shows
the feature representations of the translated and the training images, whereas the right column shows the result of the Mean
shift clustering on the corresponding points where different colours represent different classes.
AEGIS: Exposing Backdoors in Robust Machine Learning Models Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA
Figure 14: Feature representation clusters for clean CIFAR10 models from Madry-Lab. This figure shows class 0. The left
column shows the feature representations of the translated and the training images, whereas the right column shows the result
of the Mean shift clustering on the corresponding points where different colours represent different classes. It is important
to note that the translated images and training set images form separate clusters.
Figure 15: Representative false positives. These kinds of false positives occurwhenAEGIS only considers the translated images
in the detection for backdoors. This figure shows class 6 of a robust MNIST model poisoned with a localised backdoor. The
left column shows the feature representations of the translated and the training images, whereas the right column shows the
result of the Mean shift clustering on the corresponding points where different colours represent different classes.
(a) Standard model (b) Robust model
Figure 16: L1 norms (mean) of the reverse engineered triggers for backdoor-infected standard and robust models
